A review is given of the attempt by the eminent physicist, Max Born, to expound his epistemological views in the form of a system allegedly based on ``physical methods of thinking'', which Born contrasts with the epistemology of dialectical materialism. It is shown in this paper that Born's initial assumptions, i.e., sensations are purely subjective, objectivity can only be defined in terms of experience, and so on, are, in fact, subjectivist in character, whereas the propostion that the theory of probability allows us to admit the existence of a thing in itself behind mathematical structures is scientifically contradictory and, on Bom's own admission, the idea of a thing in itself is partially devoid of objective status. Having admitted the possibility of subjectivist errors in the basic assumptions of his epistemology, Born also treats a number of other epistemological questions in a way approaching positivism, although he does not personally accept this direction in philosophy. It is shown in this paper that, in contrast to Bom's epistemology, there is a scientific basis for the epistemology of dialectical materialism, and an examination of certain problems of cognition that have emerged during the evolution of modern physics is used to expose the meaning and efficacy of the epistemology of dialectical materialism.